Bern University
of Applied Sciences

Verifiable Student Board Elections with UniVote

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April 4th, 2014

Bern University
of Applied Sciences

UniVote: Project Overview

Project Overview

- UniVote = Internet voting system for student board elections at Swiss universities
- 13 months development (February 2012 – February 2013)
  - 1 main developer and server administrator (50% assistant)
  - 1 PhD student (25% developer for UniVote)
  - 4 professors (protocols, specification, system design, . . .)
- Current version: 1.7
- Source code and documentation publicly available:

  https://www.univote.ch/documentation
- Verification software available (independent student project)
- Voting simulator under development (student project at HSR)

Previous and Future Elections

- Complex ballots with party lists (similar to NR elections)
- Previous elections
  - March 2013: University of Bern (11'000)
  - April 2013: Bern University of Applied Sciences (6'000)
  - May 2013: University of Zürich (26'000)
  - September 2013: University of Lucerne (3'000)
  - October 2013: Best Teacher Award, University of Lucerne
- Current and future elections
  - April 2014: Bern University of Applied Sciences
  - October 2014: Best Teacher Award, University of Lucerne
  - Elections in 2015: UniBE, UniZH, UniLU
- Average participation: $\approx 10\%$

UniVote User Interface



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System Properties and Design

Verifiability

“One should verify the election, not the election system.”

Ben Adida

- Individual verifiability: Correctness and inclusion of single vote
- Universal verifiability: Correctness of final election result

System Properties

- PKI based on existing Swiss university eID infrastructure
- Individually and universally verifiable
- Public election board (EB)
  - All election data is published
  - Simplified implementation (no append-only or fault tolerance mechanisms)
- Distribution of trust
  - Shared decryption key (3 decryptors, no threshold)
  - Two mix networks (each with 3 mixers, no proof yet)
- Extended voter privacy
  - Secrecy: mixing the votes
  - Anonymity: mixing the public signature keys
- Transparency (source code and documentation)

Design and Specification

Rolf Haenni & Oliver Spycher
Secure Internet Voting on Limited Devices with Anonymized Public Keys
EVT/WOTE'11

Design and Specification



Design and Specification

1.3.7. Mixing and Tallying

a) Mixing the Encryptions

Let $\mathcal{E}_0 = \{E_1, \ldots, E_N\}$, $N \leq n$, be the (ordered) set of encrypted votes in $\mathcal{B}$. Repeat the following steps for each $M_k \in M$ (in ascending order for $1 \leq k \leq m$):

1. Shuffle the set encrypted votes $\mathcal{E}_{k-1}$ into $\mathcal{E}_k$:
   a) Choose $\bar{r}_k = (r_{1k}, \ldots, r_{Nk}) \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^N$ uniformly at random and compute $E'_i = ReEnc_y(E_i, r_{ik})$ for every $E_i \in \mathcal{E}_{k-1}$.
   b) Choose permutation $\tau_k : [1, N] \rightarrow [1, N]$ uniformly at random.
   c) Let $\mathcal{E}_k = \{E'_{\tau_k(i)} : 1 \leq i \leq N\} = Shuffle_{\tau_k}(\mathcal{E}_{k-1}, \bar{r}_k)$ be the new (ordered) set of encrypted votes shuffled according to τ_k.
2. Generate $\pi_{\tau_k} = NIZKP\{(\tau_k, \bar{r}_k) : \mathcal{E}_k = Shuffle_{\tau_k}(\mathcal{E}_{k-1}, \bar{r}_k)\}$ using Wikström's proof of a shuffle (see Section 1.4.7 for details).
3. Generate signature $S_{\mathcal{E}_k} = Sign_{sk_k}(id||\mathcal{E}_k||\pi_{\tau_k})$.
4. Publish $(M_k, id, \mathcal{E}_k, \pi_{\tau_k}, S_{\mathcal{E}_k})$ on EB.

Design and Specification



Design and Specification



Design and Specification



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Tools and Components

UniCrypt

- Java library for advanced cryptographic tasks
  - ElGamal encryptions
  - Commitments
  - Secret sharing
  - Re-encryption mixnets
  - Zero-knowlede proofs
  - Elliptic curves
  - Random oracles
  - Common reference strings
- Design goal: Clean and easy-to-use programming interfaces
- Version 2.0 to be released soon (summer 2014)
- Open-source project on GitHub:

  https://github.com/bfh-evg/unicrypt

Public Election Board



Public Election Board



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

Public Election Board



Voter Verifier

- Student project (bachelor thesis 2013)
- Developed independently from specification
  - Disjoint code base
  - No help from UniVote source code
- Individual verification:
  - Reads encrypted vote from QR-code
  - Checks if encrypted vote has reached the election board
  - Displays vote intention on trustworthy device
- Universal verification:
  - Reads election data from public election board
  - Checks consistency of election data
  - Total of 61 checks: parameters, signatures, crypto-proofs
  - Re-computes final election result


UniVerifier
File View Language Help
Vote Verifier
INDEPENDENT VERIFIER for UNIvote
Welcome
Ind: vsbfh-2013 x
vsuzh-2013 x
Specification
Entity
Type
Election Results
17%
Errors and Exceptions:
SYSTEM_SETUP
Schnorr's p is prime
Schnorr's q is prime
Schnorr's g is a generator
Schnorr's p is a safe prime
Schnorr's parameters length
CA certificate
EM certificate
ELECTION_SETUP
EA certificate


UniVerifier
File View Language Help
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INDEPENDENT VERIFIER for UNIvote
Welcome
Ind: vsbfh-2013 x
vsuzh-2013 x
vsuzh-2013-1 x
Specification
Entity
Type
Election Results
40%
Errors and Exceptions:
FVV 13
1.1 Cornelia Vontobel 132
1.2 Saskia Keller 108
IG Oerlikon 382
2.1 Ivan Marijanovic 852
2.2 Roberto Ramphos 739
2.3 Muriel Ehrbar 775
2.4 Nadja Busch 756
2.5 Nina Egger 776
2.6 Tristan Jennings 727
2.7 Louis Binswanger 710

Vote Verifier



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

VoteSimulator

- Answer to question: "Who checks the VoteVerifier?"
- Student project at HSR (work in progress)
- Developed independently from specification
  - Disjoint code base
  - No help from UniVote source code
  - No help from VoteVerifier source code
- Writes data for arbitrary-sized elections to election board
  - Good case: consistent data only
  - Bad case: inconsistent data from simulated attacks

Conclusion and Future Work

Conclusion

- For academics, it is very instructive ...
  - to develop a real-world election system
  - to run real elections
- Student board elections are a great testbed
- Very positive feedback ...
  - from voters
  - from research community
- Major problems
  - Small budget
  - Restricted manpower
  - Time management
  - Browser incompatibilities
  - Software maintenance (students disappear after graduating)

UniVote 2.0

- UniVote 2.0 = Complete redesign of UniVote 1.7
  - Independent append-only public election board (UniBoard)
  - Improved underlying cryptographic library (UniCrypt)
  - Extended independent registration service (UniCert) for Google+, Facebook, Twitter, etc.
  - GUI support for multiple election types
  - Improved election administration tools
  - Comprehensive documentation
- Enlarged project team
  - 2 PhD students
  - 1 full time assistant
- Lack of project funding

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