Verifiable Mixing

Philipp Locher

Bern University of Applied Sciences

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
UniVote: Verifiable Electronic Voting over the Internet

- Internet voting system for student board elections at Swiss universities
- Project started in 2012
- First elections in spring 2013
- https://www.univote.ch

Introduction

UniVote is end-to-end (E2E) verifiable and offers anonymized vote casting [Neff01, HS11].


Mixing of public keys:




Before the final decryption and tally phase, the ballots are mixed.

- Late registration (students cannot be forced to register before voting phase)
- Anonymous channel cannot always be expected
- No performance issue (only a few thousand ballots)

Mix-Nets - an Overview





Why Wikström/Terelius's Mix-Net?

- Not covered by patents
- Kind of modularity
- As efficient as other efficient mix-nets

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ElGamal Encryption

$$Enc(m,r) = (g^r, y^r m)$$

- Private key x and public key pk = (g, y), g is a generator of G_q and y = g^x
- $m \in G_q$ and $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q$
- ► Multiplicative homomorphic: Enc(m₁, r₁) · Enc(m₂, r₂) = Enc(m₁m₂, r₁ + r₂)
- Re-encryption: $ReEnc(c, r') = c \cdot Enc(1, r')$

Pedersen Commitment

$$Com(m,r) = g^r \cdot h^m$$

- g, h independently chosen generators of G_q
- $m \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q$
- Perfectly hiding and computationally binding
- Additive homomorphic: $Com(m_1, r_1) \cdot Com(m_2, r_2) = Com(m_1 + m_2, r_1 + r_2)$

Generalized Pedersen Commitment

$$Com(\bar{m},r) = g^r \cdot h_1^{m_1} \cdots h_N^{m_N} = g^r \prod_{i=1}^N h_i^{m_i}$$

- g, h_1, \ldots, h_N independently chosen generators of G_q
- $\bar{m} = (m_1, \dots, m_N) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^N$ and $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q$
- Perfectly hiding and computationally binding
- Additive homomorphic: $Com(\bar{m}_1, r_1) \cdot Com(\bar{m}_2, r_2) = Com(\bar{m}_1 + \bar{m}_2, r_1 + r_2)$

Matrix Commitment

$$Com(M, \bar{r}) = (Com((m_{i,1})_{i=1}^N, r_1), \cdots, Com((m_{i,N})_{i=1}^N, r_N))$$

•
$$M = (m_{i,j}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{N imes N}$$
 is a $N imes N$ - matrix


Perfectly hiding and computationally binding

•
$$Com(M, \bar{r})^{\bar{e}} = Com(M\bar{e}, \langle \bar{r}, \bar{e} \rangle)$$

Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge

Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge Example: Schnorr Protocol

Prover \mathcal{P} proves to verifier \mathcal{V} knowledge of x such that $y = g^x$




Maurer's Generic Preimage Proof 1/2

- Consider two groups (G, \star) and (H, \otimes) of finite order.
- If a function $\phi: G \to H$ is a homomorphism such that

$$\phi(a \star b) = \phi(a) \otimes \phi(b)$$

than \mathcal{P} can prove knowledge of x such that $y = \phi(x)$ using the following protocol:

Maurer's Generic Preimage Proof 2/2



Proof of Knowledge of Several Values (Composition)

Consider N group homomorphisms

$$G_i \to H_i : x \mapsto \phi_i(x).$$

The composition

$$G_1 \times \cdots \times G_N \to H_1 \times \cdots \times H_N :$$

(x₁,...,x_N) $\mapsto \phi(x_1,...,x_N) = (\phi_i(x_i),...,\phi_N(x_N))$

is also a group homomorphism and so prover \mathcal{P} can prove in one stroke knowledge of x_1, \ldots, x_N such that $y_i = \phi_i(x_i)$.

Proof of Equality of Embedded Values (Common Preimage)

• Consider N group homomorphisms with the same domain G

$$G \to H_i : x \mapsto \phi_i(x).$$

► The prover P can prove knowledge of x such that y_i = φ_i(x) using the function

$$G o H_1 imes \cdots imes H_N$$
:
 $x \mapsto \phi(x) = (\phi_i(x), \dots, \phi_N(x)).$

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[Wik09] A Commitment-Consistent Proof of a Shuffle

- Offline part: Commit to a permutation matrix and proof that it is indeed a permutation matrix.
- Online part: Shuffle the input batch and give a commitmentconsistent proof of a shuffle.

[TW10] Proofs of Restricted Shuffles

- Restricting the set of permutations.
- A new proof of a shuffle based on a permutation matrix.

Wikström/Terelius's Mix-Net Revisited

An $N \times N$ - matrix M is a permutation matrix if there is exactly one non-zero element in each row and column and if this non-zero element is equal to one.

Example:

$$\begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} x_3 \\ x_1 \\ x_2 \end{pmatrix}$$

If M_{π} is a permutation matrix for the permutation π then

$$M_{\pi}\cdot\bar{x}=\bar{x}'=(x_{\pi(1)},\ldots,x_{\pi(N)})$$

Theorem (Permutation Matrix) [TW10]

Let $M = (m_{i,j})$ be an $N \times N$ - matrix over \mathbb{Z}_q and $\bar{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_N)$ be a list of variables. Then M is a permutation matrix if and only if

$$\prod_{i=1}^{N} \langle \bar{m_i}, \bar{x} \rangle = \prod_{i=1}^{N} x_i \text{ and } M\bar{1} = \bar{1}$$

 m_i denotes the *i*-th row vector of M and $\langle \bar{m}_i, \bar{x} \rangle = \sum_{j=1}^N m_{i,j} x_j$ the inner product of \bar{m}_i and \bar{x}

Recall the property of a matrix commitment:

$$Com(M, \bar{s})^{\bar{e}} = Com(M\bar{e}, \langle \bar{s}, \bar{e} \rangle)$$

If M is a permutation matrix then $M\bar{e} = \bar{e}' = (e_{\pi(1)}, \dots, e_{\pi(N)})$ and $Com(M, \bar{s})^{\bar{e}}$ is a publicly computed commitment to the permuted \bar{e} - vector based on the commitment to M.

Proof of Knowledge of Permutation Matrix (offline) 1/2

Common Input: Matrix commitment c_{π} Private Input: Permutation matrix M_{π} and \bar{s} such that $c_{\pi} = Com(M_{\pi}, \bar{s})$.

1. \mathcal{V} chooses $\bar{e} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^N$ randomly and hands \bar{e} to \mathcal{P} 2. \mathcal{P} computes $v = \langle \bar{1}, \bar{s} \rangle$, $w = \langle \bar{e}, \bar{s} \rangle$ and $\bar{e}' = M_{\pi} \bar{e}$. 3. \mathcal{V} outputs the result of

$$\Sigma\operatorname{-proof} \left[\begin{array}{c} \mathsf{v}, \mathsf{w} \in \mathbb{Z}_q \\ \bar{e}' \in \mathbb{Z}_q^N \end{array} \middle| \operatorname{\mathit{Com}}(\bar{1}, \mathsf{v}) = c_\pi^{-\bar{1}} \wedge \operatorname{\mathit{Com}}(\bar{e}', \mathsf{w}) = c_\pi^{-\bar{e}} \wedge \prod_{i=1}^N e_i' = \prod_{i=1}^N e_i \right]$$

Proof of Knowledge of Permutation Matrix (offline) 2/2

The Σ -proof of the proof of knowledge of permutation matrix can be transformed into a generic preimage proof:

$$\mathbb{Z}_{q}^{2N+3} \to G_{q}^{N+3} : (v, w, \bar{r}, d, \bar{e}') \mapsto \phi_{offline}(v, w, \bar{r}, d, \bar{e}') = \\ \left(Com(0, v), Com(\bar{e}', w), g^{r_{1}} c_{0}^{e_{1}'}, \dots, g^{r_{N}} c_{N-1}^{e_{N}'}, Com(0, d) \right)$$

With additional private input: Randomness $\bar{r} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^N$ and $d = d_N$ and $d_i = r_i + e'_i d_{i-1}$ for i = 2, ..., N with $d_1 = r_1$. $c_i = g^{r_i} c_{i-1}^{e'_i}$ and $c_0 = h$.

Commitment-Consistent Proof of a Shuffle (online) 1/2

Common Input: Permutation matrix commitment c_{π} and ciphertexts (ElGamal) $u_1, \ldots, u_N, u'_1, \ldots, u'_N \in (G_q \times G_q)$. Private Input: Permutation π and randomness $\bar{r} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^N$ such that $u'_i = ReEnc(u_{\pi(i)}, r_{\pi(i)})$.

1. \mathcal{V} chooses $\bar{e} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^N$ randomly and hands \bar{e} to \mathcal{P} 2. \mathcal{P} computes $w = \langle \bar{e}, \bar{s} \rangle$, $r = \langle \bar{e}, \bar{r} \rangle$ and $\bar{e}' = M_{\pi} \bar{e}$. 3. \mathcal{V} outputs the result of

$$\Sigma\operatorname{-proof}\left[\begin{matrix} r,w\in\mathbb{Z}_{q}\\ \bar{e}'\in\mathbb{Z}_{q}^{N} \end{matrix}\right| Com(\bar{e}',w) = c_{\pi}^{\ \bar{e}} \wedge \prod_{i=1}^{N} (u'_{i})^{e'_{i}} = ReEnc(\prod_{i=1}^{N} (u_{i})^{e_{i}},r) \end{bmatrix}$$

Commitment-Consistent Proof of a Shuffle (online) 3/3

The Σ -proof of the proof of knowledge of permutation matrix can be transformed into a generic preimage proof:

$$\mathbb{Z}_q^{N+2} o G_q^3 : (r, w, \bar{e}') \mapsto \phi_{online}(r, w, \bar{e}') = \\ \left(Com(\bar{e}', w), \prod_{i=1}^N (u_i')^{e_i'} Enc(1, -r) \right)$$

Conclusion and Questions