Dagstuhl Seminar

Secure Internet Voting on an Untrusted Platform

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Who are We?

- E-voting research group since 2007
- 3 professors, 2 PhD students, 3 assistants
- Activities
 - Vote-ID'07, EVOTE'10, ISSA'10, FC'11, IFIP'11, CeDem'11, EVT/WOTE'11, ICEGOV'11
 - > Swiss E-Voting Workshop 2009 & 2010
 - > Baloti.ch (e-voting platform for immigrants living in Switzerland)



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- The voters' personal devices are untrustworthy

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- Approach 3: Distributing a secure platform
 - > Trustworthy voting device

Code Voting

Pros

- > Infrastructure exists (postal service)
- > No initial costs

Cons

- > Repetitive costs for every election
- > Slow
- > Not very user friendly (entering the codes)
- > Secure printing problem
- > Reliable? Secure?

Secure Voting Device

Pros

- > No repetitive costs for every election
- > Experience in related applications (online banking)
- > Compatible with existing protocols
- > Useful for storing/accessing personal credentials

Cons

- > High initial costs (development, production, distribution)
- > Support required (helpline)
- > Trustworthy?

Secure Voting Device

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 - > is no longer the endpoint of the communication channel
 - > does not learn anything about the voter's choice
- The trustworthy voting device ...
 - > lets the voter prepare/confirm the choice
 - > generates the electronic ballot
 - > performs all the necessary crypto
 - > does not generate a receipt

Requirements

- Easy to use (even for complex elections)
- Low-priced
- Simple (no system updates)
- Reliable
- Efficient (crypto primitives)
- Mobile
- Compatible

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Voting device

- > impersonal (e.g., one per household)
- > has a small display and a few buttons
- > has an optical scanner to read 2D-barcodes

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- Compatible with various e-voting protocols
- May help to prevent vote buying / coercion
- Possibly applicable to other applications

Questions & Discussion

(more information on http://e-voting.bfh.ch)